India’s strategic masterstroke: mastering the Malacca chokepoint

A word that often comes up in Chinese strategic writings whenever Chinese experts talk about their greatest vulnerability at sea: Malacca (马六甲). For China, the Strait of Malacca is a strategic chokepoint that its rivals will one day seek to exploit to strangulate the Chinese economy. This is what Chinese strategists refer to as the Malacca dilemma (马六甲困境). It has quietly driven billions of dollars in Chinese investments in the Indian Ocean all the way from Gwadar to Hambantota to Kyaukphyu.

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What India has done now is introduce a new piece into that chessboard that the Chinese were not expecting and from an advantageous geographical position that no amount of Chinese ports will be able to equal. The Great Nicobar Island Development Project, an ambitious project which is much more than an infrastructure initiative. It is India’s response after decades of watching its rival slowly surrounding the Indian Ocean while sitting on some of the most strategically valuable geography in the Indo-Pacific and not doing much about it.

Ignored Geography

Spanning over more than 700 kms in length, the Andaman and Nicobar islands comprise a “natural aircraft carrier” in the mouth of the Malacca Strait as envisioned by military strategists. The Great Nicobar Island, southernmost island of this chain, is located almost equidistant from Singapore, Port Klang, and Colombo. Vessels traversing the Strait of Malacca via the Six Degree Channel do so right under its tip. In terms of strategic importance, there is no better location in the whole Indian Ocean for a state looking to observe and, in certain circumstances, affect traffic at one of the world’s most strategically important waterways. This position has been in the hands of India ever since its independence. However, for the greater part of that time, it has served as little more than an outpost.

This will soon change as a comprehensive plan to transform this remote corner into a fully operational transshipment terminal is being carried out on the island. India presently suffers annual cargo losses ranging from $200-220 million due to the need for its ships to disembark at foreign ports such as Singapore, Colombo, and Klang because there are no deep-draft terminals available at home. The transhipment port alone remedies this economic sore spot. However, Great Nicobar, where natural depths surpass twenty meters, flips that calculus entirely. The first-phase port was inaugurated in late 2024 and broke through the one-million TEU mark within a year of operation.

China's Fret

In order to comprehend the significance of this project, one needs to view it through Chinese eyes. Over the past three decades, China’s strategic planners have been working tirelessly to cultivate what Western analysts have described as the “string of pearls.” A web of port projects, logistics facilities, and relationships extending from the South China Sea, across the Indian Ocean, and into the Persian Gulf. Simply put, if the Malacca Strait represents a vulnerability, create connections and logistics networks to bypass it. Gwadar in Pakistan offers China an alternative exit point to the Arabian Sea that bypasses Malacca. The Kyaukphyu area in Myanmar, linked to China by pipelines, performs an equivalent role through the Bay of Bengal. There is Hambantota in Sri Lanka, which serves as a staging point for the central Indian Ocean.

But, there is something which China cannot mimic, i.e., the location of Great Nicobar. China constructs artificial islands in the South China Sea at great geopolitical expense because it lacks natural geography at the critical junctures. The gift of nature bestowed upon India is something that China has to build itself into controversy. A functional Indian base on Great Nicobar, with all its equipment, like the Andaman and Nicobar Command, having a precision approach radar, underwater surveillance system, and naval communications network in place will mean that each Chinese ship traversing the Six Degree Channel will do so within the reach of India’s monitoring network. In case of any political tension, this is the most significant leverage one could possibly have.

The significance of this leverage is compounded by another factor that remains relatively underreported in regard to India’s northern front. The Great Coco Island in Myanmar, situated a mere 55 kilometres away from the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, has recently undergone an extensive infrastructure upgrade. India has made demands for inspections but Myanmar has merely provided assurances. Regardless of the specific details of the deal, the strategic balance is unambiguous. China has been working for decades on placing its surveillance capabilities close to the maritime boundary of India on the eastern side. Great Nicobar Island represents India’s structural response, neither a diplomatic protest nor a demarche.

Why it misreads the moment

Those who have opposed the initiative have raised legitimate environmental issues. The Great Nicobar Island possesses tropical rain forests, important nesting grounds for leatherback turtles, and more than 1,700 endemic species. The allocation of 130 square kilometres of forest land and the possible disruption of the Galathea Bay ecosystem are serious environmental considerations. The native rights of the Shompen community cannot be disregarded. Such issues demand close, independent scrutiny, and the forty-two compliance conditions proposed by the National Green Tribunal constitute one such step. However, while the environmental issue is an important one in its own right, it must not be allowed to carry any geopolitical weight which it has never been intended to carry. Indeed, there is a reasonable doubt raised by Indian security specialists concerning the amplification of an environmental issue concerning this particular project to meet geopolitical ends that have nothing whatsoever to do with the environment.

What Great Nicobar Signals

The real importance of the project lies neither in military nor security considerations. Instead, it is a matter of principle. In the decades since India gained its independence, it has followed a policy of restraint when it came to formulating a strategic doctrine in the region, which, in practical terms, meant observing from the sidelines while other countries battled for supremacy. However, China’s One Belt One Road (一带一路) strategy operates under entirely different assumptions,  namely, that infrastructures make strategies, that ports provide leverage, and that geography can even be created when a natural one cannot be found. India now learns the lesson through its own means without resorting to authoritarian practices or replacing anyone. The development of Great Nicobar will follow the rules that India itself laid down, and nothing can challenge India’s geography.

When the Indian surveillance network peers into the Six Degree Channel, it will observe precisely what China’s strategic planners fear being observed. The island that independent India neglected for decades is becoming, at last, what geography always intended it to be. In conclusion, the Great Nicobar Island Development Project marks a pivotal shift in India’s strategic posture, transforming a long-neglected geographical gem into a formidable asset. By establishing a world-class transshipment port and enhancing surveillance capabilities right at the mouth of the Malacca Strait, India not only addresses its own economic vulnerabilities but

asserts control over a critical maritime artery. Looking ahead, this project equips India to prepare for the next chokepoint crisis, whether in the South China Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, or any emerging flashpoint, by providing alternative routing options, real-time monitoring, and the leverage to support allies or deter adversaries during supply-chain disruptions. Ultimately, Great Nicobar signals that India is no longer content to observe from the sidelines but is ready to shape the Indo-Pacific’s future.

(Sriparna Pathak is a Professor of China Studies, and the founding Director of the Centre for Northeast Asian Studies at OP Jindal Global University. Nishit Kumar is a Sinologist and Assistant Professor at the Subhas Chandra Bose Chair of International Relations, Chanakya University, Bengaluru.)