The 27th Constitutional Amendment – Institutionalising Military Supremacy

Pakistan's 27th Constitutional Amendment Bill, passed on November 8, 2025, marks a decisive transformation in the country's power structure, formally entrenching the military's dominance within the constitutional framework.

The amendment establishes the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), unifying command over the Army, Navy, and Air Force, while abolishing the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Though presented as a measure to enhance operational efficiency and inter-service coordination, it effectively institutionalises military supremacy, further eroding civilian control over national security and foreign policy.

At the centre of this transformation stands the Army Chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, set to become the first CDF. By amending Article 243, the legislation grants him lifelong privileges, retention of rank, and immunity comparable to that of the President.

Consolidating operational command, strategic oversight, and control over nuclear and intelligence assets in a single office, the amendment cements the Army Chief's primacy within the state apparatus. The creation of a Commander of the National Strategic Command, appointed on the CDF's recommendation, further strengthens this concentration of authority and centralises the military chain of command.

Supporters claim it will end decades of fragmented coordination and create a coherent defence structure. By eliminating inter-service rivalries and streamlining decision-making, the government argues, Pakistan will be better positioned to address external threats.

Critics, however, warn that the amendment is a calculated move to formalise the military's political dominance under a constitutional veneer. Opposition parties, lawyers' bodies, and civil society groups have condemned it as "person-specific," designed to perpetuate General Munir's authority and shield the establishment from judicial or parliamentary scrutiny.

The Bill's passage, with strong support from the ruling coalition, underscores the civilian leadership's dependence on the armed forces.

Domestically, the implications are profound. The creation of a Federal Constitutional Court, empowered to interpret constitutional disputes, has been criticised for undermining the Supreme Court's authority and independence.

By transferring suo motu and constitutional powers to a new body perceived to be pliable, the government weakens one of the last institutional checks on military authority. The amendment also allows the federal government, in consultation with the CDF, to reallocate fiscal resources during national “emergencies.”

This clause has reignited long-standing provincial grievances, particularly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where it is viewed as a mechanism to expand central control and the military's reach into governance and local administration.

Politically, the amendment signifies a further regression in Pakistan's democratic evolution. By blurring the distinction between civil and military authority, it institutionalises the military's position as the supreme arbiter of state policy.

The judiciary and Parliament — intended as balancing institutions — are increasingly marginalised, while opposition parties face a political environment shaped by military oversight and selective enforcement.

The reform thus completes Pakistan's transition from a hybrid regime to one where the military's dominance is constitutionally enshrined and self-perpetuating.

Regionally, the amendment signals a more assertive and security-centric approach in Pakistan's external relations.

For Afghanistan, this may translate into a more uncompromising stance on cross-border militancy and the Durand Line issue, as the unified command allows for faster, centralised responses to border challenges.

For China, a long-standing strategic partner, the creation of the CDF offers a single-point interface for security cooperation under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), enhancing protection for key projects and personnel. However, greater militarisation also heightens policy rigidity, leaving little scope for diplomatic flexibility or civilian mediation.

The implications for India-Pakistan relations are particularly significant. India has long viewed the Pakistan Army as the central actor shaping Islamabad's policies on Kashmir, terrorism, and cross-border engagement.

The formalisation of the CDF role confirms this reality, leaving minimal space for civilian diplomacy or political negotiation. The absence of a political buffer raises the risk of rapid escalation during crises — whether along the Line of Control or in response to terrorist incidents — since decisions will now emanate from a command structure exclusively dominated by military logic.

For New Delhi, this development necessitates a recalibration of its diplomatic and military posture. While Pakistan's military may gain internal coherence, it simultaneously removes the last pretence of civilian oversight.

The 27th Amendment completes Pakistan's transition to a system where the Army is both guardian and governor, hollowing out democratic institutions and embedding militarisation within the constitutional order.

The military's domestic consolidation and regional assertiveness will shape South Asia's strategic landscape, reinforcing the reality that Pakistan's generals, not its politicians, remain the ultimate arbiters of national destiny.

With the addition of more Baloch activists into the Fourth Schedule list, the Pakistan establishment is trying to solve the Baloch crisis with extreme repression. Given the present state of the rising Baloch insurgency, this latest move can only fuel further bloodshed.