US, Russia, and the great game of nuclear rhetoric
- Aayushi Sharma
- 7 minutes ago
- 6 min read
A month after Russia and the US declared their intentions of resuming nuclear testing, the global nuclear order and security landscape remains shrouded in uncertainty. This article analyses the ambiguity behind the threats and allegations of nuclear testing, the history of nuclear threat mongering between Russia and the United States, as well as the extent to which these developments are mere rhetoric or actual strategic signals.
It has been a month since the threat of renewed nuclear testing loomed over the world as Russia and the US declared their intentions to resume testing if deemed necessary. The immediate precursor to this development was the tests conducted by Russia over the past months, which included a nuclear-capable cruise missile, Burevestnik, and the Unmanned Underwater Vehicle, Poseidon, which has been defined as a cross between a torpedo and a drone.
The Burevestnik, translating to "Storm Petrel," is designed to carry a thermonuclear warhead. It has been code-named Skyfall by NATO. Russia announced the successful completion of the final test phase, with President Putin claiming the missile possesses “unlimited range” and is "invincible," unable to be stopped by air defense systems. The missile’s advantage is not its speed, but its global unpredictability. Its infinite range allows it to fly complex, prolonged paths, circling the globe to evade continental missile defense systems and striking from unexpected vectors, designed to create a "nightmare scenario" for Western military planners.
The Poseidon, on the other hand, is an autonomous, nuclear-powered mini-submarine that represents a new class of strategic weapons. It is designed to deliver both conventional and nuclear warheads. The device is estimated to be up to 20 meters long and 2 meters in diameter, with a mass of up to 100 metric tons. The Poseidon is designed for intercontinental-range missions, boasting a range of 10,000 kilometers and a maximum depth of 1,000 meters. Its nuclear propulsion allows it to remain submerged for extended durations and approach targets covertly, making it exceptionally difficult to track or intercept. The weapon is rumoured to carry a high-yield nuclear warhead, speculated to be 2 megatons or more. It's claimed retaliatory role is to destroy large coastal cities or naval bases by triggering a massive, radioactive tsunami, thereby rendering vast coastal zones permanently uninhabitable.
The tests of these systems, coupled with readiness drills for nuclear forces, have highlighted Russia’s growing strategy of nuclear brinkmanship to achieve psychological coercion. The subsequent statements by the US President Donald Trump in favour of nuclear testing became a strategic signal to Russia in response to these developments. This willingness to extend nuclear rhetoric and the threat of proliferation is a function of the fragmented nuclear order we see at present. The vacuum, created by the lack of enforced arms control treaties and increased threat perception of nuclear weapon states, has brought us back to the age of nuclear threat mongering, this time extrapolated with the risk posed by emerging technologies.
This article analyses the ambiguity behind the threats and allegations of nuclear testing, the history of nuclear threat mongering between Russia and the United States, as well as the extent to which these developments are mere rhetoric or actual strategic signals.
The question of testing
The idea of resuming nuclear testing does seem like the beginning of an armageddon scenario; however, these developments need to be critically assessed. It is important to consider why nuclear testing by Russia or the US will be such a turning point in the global nuclear order. At present, there is no legal framework that outlaws nuclear testing completely. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a treaty formed to prohibit all forms of nuclear testing, is not in force. Its enforcement is conditional upon the signing and ratification by all the states mentioned in the Annexure of the treaty. However, prohibiting supercritical nuclear tests became a normative standard when many states placed a voluntary moratorium on testing in their national capacities. The United States and Russia also have a moratorium in effect that discontinues any nuclear tests that produce a self-sustaining and supercritical chain reaction. While both countries claimed adherence to these standards, suspicions remained.
The United States has been sceptical of Russian activities on its testing sites. Therefore, the discussions surrounding interests in nuclear testing are not a new phenomenon. The United States had reason to believe, through intelligence, that Russia had already conducted nuclear-weapons-related tests at the Novaya Zemlya site, hence breaching its voluntary moratorium. On the other hand, Sergei Ryabkov has also accused the United States of preparing for a nuclear test in Nevada. While the US has admitted to conducting subcritical non-nuclear tests, it has claimed its compliance with the norms set forth by the CTBT.
The most significant blow to the CTBT regime was dealt when Russia withdrew from the treaty, citing differences with the United States. Even though the US has placed a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, it is one of the states that has not ratified the treaty. Russia, while withdrawing from the treaty, sought to achieve parity with the United States when it comes to standards pertaining to nuclear testing.
Consequently, at present, neither country is a party to the treaty, and their intentions regarding nuclear testing are shrouded in ambiguity.
Rhetoric or strategic signalling?
As the multilateral and bilateral mechanisms face challenges, many assertions have been made about the downfall and subsequent failure of the nuclear arms control regime.
Russia has withdrawn from various nuclear arms control treaties over the past years. This development can either be dismissed as mere nuclear threat mongering or be considered as Russia’s attempts to make the threat of nuclear escalation more credible. Withdrawal from these treaties, coupled with the modernisation of nuclear-capable arsenal and the declared possibility of resuming testing, has pointed toward a doctrine of nuclear escalation adopted by Russia. Even with an expressed interest in extending their commitments to the New START, recent developments have cast a shadow on the willingness of both sides to cooperate on nuclear de-escalation.
Apart from the disruption of arms control treaties, the period from 2024 to 2025 has witnessed the intensification of nuclear rhetoric from both Russia and the United States. In 2024, Russia made formal changes to its nuclear doctrine, which emphasised nuclear deterrence to ensure Russia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. The new policy indicated that Russia will launch nuclear weapons if attacked on its territory by a non-nuclear state backed by a nuclear state. This set the stage for a more aggressive approach to creating a credible nuclear deterrence posture for Russia and indicating that Russia is willing to launch a nuclear strike even in response to a conventional attack. The same year, Russia also fired the intermediate-range ballistic missile, Oreshnik. This became significant as it was the first time a nuclear-armed missile, powered by multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) technology, had been fired in its conflict with Ukraine. Russia has also expanded its nuclear footprint by deploying tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus.
A study conducted by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies highlighted that Russian spokespersons used the rhetoric of nuclear weapons at least 200 times since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
The United States and the Western allies, which began by underestimating or even underplaying the rhetorical threats, started to gradually shift their stand on nuclear posturing as well. Back in 2023, the then US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan dismissed the concerns around strategic nuclear weapons use on Ukraine or on the Western allies, but maintained that the threat of tactical nuclear weapons use on the battlefield remained.
At present, however, developments have indicated that the nuclear threat is not merely rhetorical but also backed up by tactical changes in policy and posture by Russia. Testing of a nuclear-capable cruise missile and an unmanned nuclear-powered mini-submarine are prime examples of Russia’s interests in modernising its nuclear weapons delivery systems. The US President Donald Trump claimed that the US should resume nuclear testing on an ‘equal basis’ with the other countries. The rationale is intelligence on developments at nuclear testing sites in Russia and China. This initially ambiguous statement by Donald Trump was further clarified by the US Energy Secretary Chris Wright to suggest that Trump was referring to subcritical non-nuclear explosions. The US has not conducted a supercritical nuclear test since 1992, and a move in this direction at present would further jeopardise the global nuclear order.
Even though Donald Trump’s statements on nuclear testing could still be considered rhetoric, and it is unlikely that the US would move toward conducting a super-critical nuclear test, developments in Russia could not be ignored as mere rhetoric. Russia is moving toward nuclear brinkmanship to increase its credible deterrence against the US and its NATO allies. The era of rhetoric and threat mongering has now given way to a more strategic arms race that would fill the vacuum created by a failing regime of non-proliferation and arms control. The dynamics between Russia and the US in this domain are the prime driver of this change.