Israel’s attack on Iran might strengthen Iran’s nuclear resolve

Israel launched attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities in an attempt to eliminate the existential threat posed by Iran in the form of its nuclear programme. This attack came right after two major developments - Trump authorised US troops to depart from parts of the Middle East, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) formally declared Iran in breach of its non-proliferation obligations. Trump’s actions suggest that the US may have anticipated or perhaps had prior knowledge of the attack. The IAEA declaring Iran in breach of its agreements further gave Israel the green light to launch its attack. 

Israel’s preemptive strike on Iran aims to tackle Iran’s nuclear question through military means. However, would it deter Iran to the extent Israel anticipates, or would it lead to another full-scale conflict in the region? 

It is essential here to understand the stability-instability paradox in this case and consider how deterrence works when dealing with two nuclear powers. From Iran’s perspective, Israel is an ambiguous nuclear state, and there is no credible information about Israel’s nuclear doctrine and postures, let alone about the arsenal it possesses. Hence, Israel becomes an unstable factor in Iran’s security calculus. To ‘secure’ itself against Israel’s nuclear posture, it has to build its own nuclear capability to also make up for Israel’s strength in conventional military aspects. The only way Iran could stabilise this situation is to develop nuclear weapons capability or to stay on the brink of a breakout. The recent attack on the nuclear facilities proves the fact to Iran that Israel is the reason for its heightened threat perception in the region. Israel, on the other hand, also considers Iran a destablising factor in the Middle East. While Israel has the US-backed military superiority, Iran’s stronghold in the region lies in the hands of its proxies. The one equalising factor in this asymmetric situation is nuclear weapons. Even though Iran resorts to using proxies in the region, Israel considers its nuclear weapons programme as the one existential threat it faces. This is where the difference in the perceived doctrines of both states comes into the picture - where, on the one hand, Iran responds to this threat by keeping an ambiguous nuclear programme, and Israel resorts to preemptive actions. 

Deterrence by punishment 

What Israel is attempting to achieve out of these strikes is not only to cripple Iran’s existing nuclear programme but also to deter it from developing its nuclear programme further. Deterrence by punishment implies that one actor is ready to inflict punishment on the other to stop it from carrying out an undesirable action. In Israel’s understanding, Iran would be punished with nuclear strikes if it continued to build a nuclear programme because it is not in Israel’s security interests. 

However, deterrence by punishment does not create a condition for stability and security in the region and could increase the cost of conflicts. Israel’s recent attacks on Iran have put the whole region at risk of a broader conflict between the two countries and have demonstrated that nuclear facilities are not out of the scope of military attacks. Deterrence by punishment raises the instability perception of the targetted state and hence would incentivise them more to build nuclear weapons capability to ensure its own security in a hostile region.

Failure of diplomatic measures 

The consistent failure to continue negotiations with Iran points to the lack of diplomatic measures being taken to bring Iran to a favourable agreement. The United States, under Trump’s second term, sought to form a new deal with Iran, one that would ensure that Iran never develops nuclear weapons. However, the sole demand from Iran to stop enriching uranium altogether made this approach coercive.

Apart from the failure of bilateral diplomatic efforts to curtail Iran’s nuclear programme, the international nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has also had its share of troubles in ensuring Iran’s compliance with its safeguards and verification standards. Israel’s attack on Iran followed the IAEA’s formal declaration of Iran being in breach of its non-proliferation obligations and reported repeated failures in disclosing undeclared nuclear sites and lacking cooperation with the organisation. Israel has, time and again, warned of a military attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities if Iran fails to halt its nuclear proliferation. When the recent round of talks fell short of favourable results, it prompted Israel to resort to preemptive actions and take matters into its own hands. The caveat here is that this military and offensive approach to deterring another country is unlikely to result in the desired outcomes. 

The coercive approach that Israel and, to an extent, the US are attempting to use on Iran will be more than counterproductive. For a country that had been able to bring itself to a nuclear breakout capability in the face of significant economic sanctions, it will not take long to recover the damage done to its nuclear facilities by these airstrikes. 

Even though there have been instances of consistent diplomatic failures, taking the military route will only increase the threat perception and, hence, the instability factor for Iran, leading it to resort to its developing its nuclear programme further and stabilising its security. In this scenario, the solution to the Iranian nuclear problem hardly resides in the military option. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has vowed to retaliate in full measure against Israel’s strikes. Hence, it would not be wrong to say that the country has not been ‘deterred’ in any respect. 

The best bet to keep Iran’s nuclear developments under check is to bring the country into a legally binding multilateral deal, something which the JCPOA attempted to do and succeeded to an extent until Trump pulled the US back from the agreement. Bringing Iran into a legally binding agreement that compels full adherence to IAEA safeguards and strictly limits uranium enrichment well below weapons-grade levels would significantly enhance mutual confidence. Such an agreement would ensure comprehensive verification by the IAEA, addressing concerns about the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities and providing the necessary assurances to the international community that nuclear material is not being diverted for military purposes. This level of transparency and compliance would help resolve outstanding issues, reduce proliferation risks, and lay a foundation for more constructive diplomatic engagement between Iran and other states. On the other hand, coercing Iran into submission will only result in the strengthening of the country’s nuclear resolve.