Why the US and Iran may not arrive at a nuclear deal

Iran and the US recently concluded the fifth round of negotiations, mediated by Oman, in Rome and the US President Donald Trump hinted at a major announcement regarding a deal with Iran in the coming days. After years of stalemate on negotiations for a new deal, these rounds of talks between the two countries are a welcome development. It was under Donald Trump’s previous administration that the US withdrew itself unilaterally from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the deal concluded after intense negotiations between Iran and P5 plus the European Union (EU) and Germany. Under the deal, Iran had decided to limit its uranium enrichment in return for the lifting of the economic sanctions. Then came Donald Trump in 2018, and he turned the deal on its head while also imposing additional sanctions on Iran. Iran responded by increasing its uranium enrichment programme. At present, Iran is a threshold nuclear-weapon state. While it maintains that its nuclear programme is a peaceful one and not intended for weapons development, it is capable of breaking out into a nuclear weapon state when it desires. 

Trump 2.0 came with a new ambition—striking a new deal with Iran. While Trump was able to kickstart talks with the country, mutual distrust, apprehensions, a lack of security assurances, and a volatile strategic calculus in the Middle East may halt any considerable progress toward the development of a new nuclear deal. 

Points of Contention

Iran’s enrichment of uranium is not entirely a violation of international legal standards because even the non-proliferation treaties permit the enrichment of uranium for nuclear energy and civilian purposes, provided they are subjected to regular verification and monitoring mechanisms, as conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This is particularly one of the reasons why Iran has positioned its uranium-enrichment programme as a ‘non-negotiable’ to arrive at a deal with the US. Previously, within the JCPOA, Iran had agreed to limit its uranium enrichment to 3.67 per cent, well below the weapons-grade capacity, so it is unlikely that Iran would deny the same provisions under a ‘new deal.’ The point of contention remains regarding the approach of the Trump administration toward Iran. The US foreign policy for Iran under Trump 2.0 has particularly been more ‘coercive’ and threatening. Trump has highlighted his ‘maximum pressure campaign’ to coerce Iran to come to the table and conclude a new deal. The United States is aiming to restrict Iran’s uranium-enrichment programme completely this time; this condition is not acceptable to Iran, considering that it maintains its nuclear programme is for civilian and not military purposes. Iran is not likely to compromise with its uranium-enrichment facilities and completely dismantle its nuclear programme. This could result in another deadlock. 

Figure 1: Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities as disclosed to the IAEA (Source: Nuclear Threat Initiative, IAEA/ Reuters)

The ‘maximum pressure’ strategy of Donald Trump has also led to US imposing further sanctions on Iran. These sanctions are designed to curtail Iran’s revenue streams, restrict its ability to fund its nuclear and regional activities and force diplomatic concessions. Most recently, sanctions were imposed on Iran’s construction sector, especially if the construction activities were linked to uranium enrichment and proliferation of nuclear energy.  Pressurizing another country and threatening ‘military actions’ against its nuclear facilities may not be a tactical strategy to come to an appropriate deal. Iran has, for decades now, dealt with the US sanctions in one form or another, the relations between the two countries have remained sour ever since the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

Given the Iranian establishment’s demonstrated ability to withstand US pressure over its nuclear program thus far, there is little reason to expect Iran to capitulate except on its own terms.

Israel remains another contentious issue, the geopolitical tensions with Israel and the open support provided by the US to the country further add to Iran’s willingness to remain a threshold nuclear state, to keep Israel at bay, and also counter Israel’s nuclear programme, the details of which have largely remained ambiguous.  Israel has repeatedly expressed its willingness to resort to military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities if need be. The most recent threats suggested a military strike if the US-Iran talks fail. The Natanz nuclear enrichment facility in Iran has been subjected to various attacks by Israel in the past, one of them was a virus attack that sabotaged the facility. Iran’s nuclear programme is a direct threat to Israel, and if Iran breaks out into a nuclear weapons capability, it may tip the whole strategic calculus of the Middle East. Iran’s nuclear weapons development, thus, is not just a breach of international non-proliferation mechanisms but will also have major strategic repercussions for the region and beyond. It has been directly stated by Saudi Arabia that it won’t shy away from pursuing its own nuclear weapons programme if Iran also chooses to do so. At this point, however, Iran’s nuclear programme, albeit ‘peaceful’ as claimed by the country, is a bargaining chip and leverage against Israel’s military supriority and the Israel-US military alignment. 

Iran’s engagement with the IAEA has also suggested considerable resistance to adhering to verification by international standards. This has further complicated the perceptions of Iran’s nuclear programme as a ‘peaceful’ one. In one of the recent reports of the Board of Governors of the IAEA, several outstanding issues were highlighted, which dealt with possible undeclared nuclear material and nuclear-related activities in Iran. These activities have not been declared to the IAEA under the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol. 

“The Director General became deeply concerned that, as proven by the verification activities conducted by the Agency, nuclear material had been present at three of these undeclared locations in Iran, and that the current location of this nuclear material was not known to the Agency.” 

-NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran

Iran’s nuclear programme itself is shrouded in mystery, considering there are enrichment sites undeclared to the IAEA, this further adds to questions about Iran’s intentions with its nuclear programme. 

Remaining at the threshold of a breakout capability is in Iran’s favour at this point to balance the strategic threats coming it's way. The pressure is rising, and the US and Israel are threatening military actions against nuclear facilities if Iran fails to succeed. In this scenario, these talks may be an important step to resume dialogue, but they are not enough. Iran’s nuclear policy does not exist in isolation; it is the direct result of the geopolitical issues plaguing the Middle East. Iran sees its nuclear programme as another tool to maintain its position in the region, and the country is not likely to compromise with this agenda. However, the precedent of the JCPOA suggests that limiting Iran’s nuclear ambitions is possible, given the right approach. The coercive ‘maximum pressure’ approach adopted by the United States may not be the one.