William Lai from Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the victor of Taiwan’s presidential elections held in January 2024, is all set to be inaugurated on May 20, 2024. Lai’s victory, while a positive sign for the US and Europe, begs to be weighed against Taipei’s Legislative Yuan elections in which DPP lost its majority (51 seats) to the main opposition, the Kuomintang (52 seats), which is often seen as China’s preferred party to rule Taiwan.
Beijing’s measured response to the election result is telling in this regard - it stated that DPP’s victory “does not represent the mainstream public opinion”, and that it won’t change China’s resolve for reunification. It can be argued that while Lai’s victory is not exactly what Beijing wanted, they now have room to lobby and engage with the KMT to push its agenda at the expense of the DPP's agenda, thanks to KMT’s majority in the Legislative Yuan . It also brings to fore the importance of Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and its Presidential candidate, Ko Wen-je, for a possible alliance with DPP if Lai wants to have the upper hand in governing Taiwan’s domestic affairs and foreign policy. Ko Wen-je managed to secure 26.5% of the vote in the Presidential election, and the TPP managed to secure 8 seats in the Legislative Yuan, revealing their ability to pull votes from both DPP & KMT and emerging as a formidable third front in Taiwanese politics.
With these developments, analysts have suggested that there is an increasing scope of China utilizing “gray zone” tactics to target the DPP and Lai. As US Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently concluded his trip to Beijing where he met Xi Jinping, Taiwan reported Chinese warplanes (including Su-30 fighters) flying sorties over Taiwan Strait hours after Blinken left China. Previously too, China has not shied away from resorting to militarily aggressive actions, coercing Taiwan’s allies to sever ties with Taipei (recent one being Nauru), diplomatic arm-twisting, and economic penalties to isolate the island nation from the world.
While such overt actions are easy to identify, it becomes extremely important to pick on hints from the happenings in Chinese domestic politics that may shed light on the future “gray zone” tactics (which are otherwise hard to identify) that Beijing may employ to counter Taiwan & its allies.
On March 06, 2024, Xi Jinping called on political advisors who were attending the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) “to offer suggestions, build consensus for Chinese modernization”. While he met with political advisors from the sector of science & technology, and the sector of environment & resources, it was his meeting with the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang (RCCK) that demanded deeper scrutiny.
The RCCK is one of the eight minor political parties that are a part of the CPPCC, and is officially ranked second after the Chinese Communist Party (CPC), making it the first-ranked minor political party. It is also allotted the second highest number of seats in the CPPCC at 30%. While the CPPCC does not hold any real legislative power, and usually functions only in an advisory role to the CPC, RCCK’s role as a tool for CCP to create discord in the Taiwanese community cannot be undermined.
The primary roles of RCCK include improving relations with the Kuomintang in Taiwan, and recruiting members with current ties to Taiwan who support “Chinese Reunification”. It is also officially committed to “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. In pursuance of these goals, the Central Committee of the RCCK has 6 major departments:
General Office,
Organization Department,
Propaganda Department,
Liaison Department,
Social Services Department,
Research Department.
Meeting with the political advisors of RCCK, among others, Xi Jinping suggested a focus on major strategic tasks laid out at the 20th CPC National Congress. And on the question of Taiwan, the political advisors discussed “how to boost cross-Strait cooperation on industrial and supply chains”, and “how to unswervingly promote the complete reunification of the motherland”. But more interestingly, Xi pointed to a theoretical study program that the RCCK had recently undertaken on the theme of “consolidating foundation by strengthening cohesion and forging soul, marching forward in unity on the new journey”. As a part of this study, RCCK’s political advisors were involved in actively discussing the promotion of cross-Strait economic and cultural exchanges.
Furthermore, Xi called on the RCCK to “better unite all patriotic forces (both at home and abroad)” to “constantly expand the front against ‘Taiwan independence’ and for reunification, and jointly advance China's peaceful reunification”. He also identified the need to promote cross-strait cooperation across science & technology, agriculture, people-to-people contact, and the development of young people.
With these goals in mind, it needs to be realized that while the RCCK and CPPCC may only function in advisory roles, they form a part of the larger umbrella of “united front work” carried out by the United Front Work Department (UFWD). Taiwan’s reunification is one of the top priorities for the CCP, as spelled out at the 20th CPC National Congress.
UFWD, being infamous for spearheading CCP’s foreign information, disinformation, misinformation, and other information warfare campaigns, will certainly move aggressively on achieving the said goals via the RCCK. And the recent election results, especially of the Legislative Yuan, provide a lot of room for RCCK and the UFWD to undertake such actions with the help of people from Taiwan itself. This could also probably explain why the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council had remarked that “the results of the two elections in Taiwan this time show that the Democratic Progressive Party does not represent the mainstream public opinion on the island”.
While the statement is not true, it does expose CCP’s future intentions of leveraging the population that is more pro-China. Kuomintang’s majority in the Legislative Yuan, and a 33.5% vote to Yu-ih, may provide the necessary teeth to UFWD & RCCK to recruit more pro-Beijing individuals, elites and organizations. And since the Propaganda Department under the RCCK is a reality, it will not be surprising if we see China increase its aggressive play at spreading disinformation/misinformation with regards to Taiwan, and lure pro-China Taiwanese into their fold under the garb of people-to-people exchanges.
Plus, due to TPP’s emergence as a third political front & a potential kingmaker, we could also witness the newly formed party & its members becoming the target of CCP’s information warfare & people-to-people exchange tactics. A Global Times article in January 2024, after the Taiwan elections concluded, asserted that “if the TPP chooses to cooperate with the KMT, it will form a larger force to restrain the DPP”. Additionally, the article further interprets ‘Lai’s victory with 40% vote share’ as ‘60% voters on the island want to replace DPP’. This makes it amply clear that Beijing’s outlook towards TPP is not positive, and will add to CCP’s paranoia to counter what it perceives to be ‘secessionist forces’.
It was surprising that China had not undertaken extremely aggressive measures post the election, defying existing precedent, but its recent actions in the aftermath of Blinken’s visit to Beijing point towards a suspicious trend. Even as China and the US try to build upon a recent thaw in relations, Beijing will resort more towards employing influence operations versus overt actions. The advantage of plausible deniability comes in handy for China while negotiating a thaw with the US, and allows Beijing to continue its tirade against Taipei at the same time. Recent arrests of Chinese individuals suspected of carrying out espionage activities in Germany serve as a stark reminder of China’s ‘dual-faced diplomacy’ as it continues to posit its want for healthier relations with Europe. And this holds true for China’s relations with most of the countries across the globe.
Realizing and accepting this reality while countering China’s gray zone tactics & influence operations will hold the key for a stable DPP government in Taiwan as it nears its inauguration.