India and Pakistan: The Elusive Quest for Conventional Deterrence Below the Nuclear Threshold

Operation Sindoor is the name of India's offensive military actions against Pakistan after the Pahalgam terror attack.

The relationship between India and Pakistan has been fraught with tension and conflict since their independence in 1947. This enduring rivalry, punctuated by multiple wars and persistent border skirmishes, took on a new dimension with both nations achieving nuclear weapons capability in 1998. While nuclear weapons were expected to usher in an era of strategic stability by raising the costs of large-scale conflict, the reality has been more complex. India, despite its significantly larger conventional military and a declared nuclear arsenal, continues to struggle to establish a credible conventional deterrence against Pakistan below the threshold of nuclear war. This paper explores the multifaceted reasons behind this challenge, examining the historical context of their conflicts, the intricacies of nuclear deterrence theory, the evolution of military doctrines, the impact of asymmetric warfare, the role of non-state actors, the influence of emerging technologies, the limitations of confidence-building measures, and the overarching impact of international actors.

The history of conflict between India and Pakistan provides crucial context for understanding their current security dynamics. The first Indo-Pakistani War in 1947-1948, immediately following partition, centred on the disputed region of Kashmir and left a lasting legacy of unresolved territorial claims. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, stemming from Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar aimed at inciting an insurgency in Kashmir, escalated into a full-scale military confrontation involving conventional forces on both sides. The 1971 war, triggered by the Bangladesh Liberation War in erstwhile East Pakistan, resulted in a decisive Indian victory and the creation of Bangladesh, significantly altering the regional power balance. A particularly significant conflict in the context of nuclearization was the Kargil War of 1999. This limited war, fought in the high-altitude terrain of Kashmir, occurred after both nations had openly declared their nuclear capabilities, demonstrating the limitations of nuclear deterrence in preventing sub-nuclear conflict. 

Following the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, India initiated Operation Parakram, a large-scale military mobilization along the border with Pakistan in 2001-2002. This prolonged standoff, while not escalating into full-scale war, highlighted the dangers of brinkmanship between nuclear-armed adversaries. More recent developments have included cross-border skirmishes and instances of India responding to terrorist attacks with targeted strikes, such as the surgical strikes after the Uri attack in 2016, the Balakot airstrikes in 2019, and the recent Operation Sindoor in response to the Pahalgam attack in April 2025. The enduring Kashmir dispute has consistently served as a flashpoint, fuelling mistrust and shaping the strategic calculations of both nations. Pakistan's strategic behaviour has often involved initiating conflict or provocation, perhaps under the assumption that its nuclear arsenal would deter a significant Indian conventional response. In contrast, India's reactions have evolved from large-scale military mobilizations to more focused and assertive actions, indicating a dynamic shift in its strategic thinking on managing its relationship with Pakistan below the nuclear threshold.

The presence of nuclear weapons in both India and Pakistan introduces the complex concept of the "stability-instability paradox." This theory suggests that while nuclear weapons create stability at the highest level of conflict by making large-scale war too costly, they can simultaneously lead to instability at lower levels of violence. In the context of India and Pakistan, this paradox manifests as Pakistan potentially feeling emboldened to engage in proxy warfare or limited conventional incursions, believing that India will be deterred from a major conventional retaliation due to the risk of nuclear escalation. 

India, therefore, faces the significant challenge of responding effectively to these lower-level provocations without risking an escalation to a full-scale conventional war that could potentially cross Pakistan's ill-defined nuclear red lines. Pakistan's strategic calculus appears to heavily rely on exploiting this stability-instability dynamic, using the implicit or explicit threat of nuclear escalation to deter India's conventional superiority. Pakistan's adoption of a "full spectrum deterrence" doctrine and its emphasis on the development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons further underscore its intent to lower the nuclear threshold and deter even limited Indian conventional incursions. India's declared commitment to a "no-first-use" nuclear policy, while demonstrating a responsible approach to nuclear weapons, might be interpreted by Pakistan as a self-imposed constraint on India's retaliatory options, potentially incentivizing Pakistani adventurism below the nuclear threshold. The lack of clarity surrounding Pakistan's nuclear red lines and its stated willingness to employ tactical nuclear weapons creates a significant degree of uncertainty, further complicating India's conventional deterrence planning. India must constantly factor in the possibility of Pakistan resorting to nuclear weapons even in response to conventional attacks, making any conventional retaliation a high-stakes decision with potentially catastrophic consequences.

The Kargil War of 1999 serves as a stark reminder that nuclear deterrence does not automatically prevent conventional conflict between nuclear-armed states. Despite both India and Pakistan having declared their nuclear capabilities in the preceding year, Pakistan initiated a covert incursion into the Indian-side of Kashmir, occupying strategic heights in the Kargil sector. Pakistan's motivations for this action likely included a miscalculation of India's response and a belief that its nuclear arsenal would effectively deter a large-scale Indian retaliation across the Line of Control (LoC). India responded with a determined conventional military campaign, facing significant challenges due to the terrain and the strategic advantage held by the Pakistani intruders. Notably, India chose to limit its conventional military response to its side of the LoC, refraining from crossing into Pakistan proper, a decision likely influenced by the fear of escalating the conflict to a level that could trigger a nuclear response from Pakistan. International pressure, particularly strong diplomatic intervention from the United States, played a crucial role in compelling Pakistan to withdraw its forces and de-escalate the conflict. 

The Kargil War provided critical lessons about the complexities of deterrence in a nuclearized environment, highlighting that the possession of nuclear weapons does not preclude conventional conflict, especially if one side believes it can achieve limited objectives without crossing the perceived nuclear threshold. India's restraint during the war, while perhaps strategically prudent at the time, may have inadvertently reinforced Pakistan's belief in the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent in constraining India's conventional options. Furthermore, the conflict exposed significant intelligence failures on both sides and underscored the urgent need for more robust mechanisms for crisis communication and escalation control between the two neighbours.

In response to Pakistan's persistent asymmetric challenges and the perceived constraints imposed by the nuclear overhang, India has been actively working to enhance its conventional military capabilities and develop doctrines aimed at establishing a more credible conventional deterrence. A key element of this effort has been the evolution of the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine, which envisions the Indian military launching swift, shallow incursions into Pakistani territory in response to provocations, all while remaining below the threshold that would trigger a nuclear response from Pakistan. This doctrine, now manifesting in the form of Integrated Battle Groups, aims to punish Pakistan for its actions without escalating to a full-scale conventional war. However, the Cold Start doctrine faces several limitations and challenges. Pakistan has developed counter-strategies, most notably the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, specifically intended to deter India from undertaking such incursions.40 There are also significant logistical and operational hurdles associated with ensuring the rapid mobilization and effective execution of the Cold Start doctrine.

Moreover, the inherent risk of miscalculation remains a major concern, as any conventional incursion, even if intended to be limited, carries the potential to escalate and inadvertently cross Pakistan's nuclear threshold. In recent years, India's conventional military thinking appears to be evolving beyond the concept of large-scale ground incursions envisioned in the Cold Start doctrine. There is an increasing emphasis on leveraging precision strike capabilities and air power to respond to Pakistani provocations, as demonstrated by the Balakot airstrikes in 2019 and the more recent Operation Sindoor in 2025. These operations suggest a growing confidence in India's technological capabilities and a potential preference for targeted responses that aim to inflict punitive damage without necessarily seizing and holding territory, thus potentially mitigating some of the escalation risks associated with the Cold Start doctrine.

Pakistan's military doctrine is fundamentally shaped by its perceived conventional inferiority vis-à-vis India. This has led to a strong emphasis on asymmetric warfare and a reliance on its nuclear arsenal as the ultimate deterrent against Indian conventional superiority. A critical component of Pakistan's deterrence strategy is the development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). These low-yield nuclear weapons are intended to counter India's Cold Start doctrine and its conventional military advantages by threatening to escalate any limited conventional conflict to the nuclear level. However, Pakistan's reliance on TNWs carries significant risks for regional stability. It lowers the nuclear threshold, increasing the possibility of early use in a conflict, and raises serious concerns about the command and control of such weapons in fluid battlefield scenarios. The potential for miscalculation and unintended escalation resulting from the deployment of TNWs is also a major worry. In addition to its nuclear strategy, Pakistan has also consistently employed proxy warfare and support for non-state actors as another key element of its asymmetric response to India. 

This approach allows Pakistan to challenge Indian authority, particularly in Kashmir, while maintaining a degree of deniability and avoiding direct conventional confrontation.

The alleged support provided by Pakistan to non-state actors and cross-border terrorism directed at India presents a unique and persistent challenge to India's deterrence efforts. India faces significant difficulties in deterring and effectively responding to terrorism that it believes is sponsored by Pakistan but carried out by ostensibly independent non-state actors. A key challenge lies in definitively attributing specific terrorist attacks directly to the Pakistani state and determining the appropriate threshold for conventional retaliation in response. Pakistan consistently denies any direct involvement in these attacks, often portraying them as indigenous Kashmiri movements, thus utilizing terrorism as an asymmetric tool to bleed India without risking large-scale conventional retaliation.25 India's responses to major terrorist attacks, such as the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the 2016 Uri attack, the 2019 Pulwama attack, and the recent Pahalgam attack in 2025, reflect its ongoing struggle to establish effective deterrence against what it perceives as state-sponsored terrorism.1 While India has historically exercised strategic restraint, the more recent operations like the surgical strikes after Uri and the Balakot airstrikes after Pulwama, and now Operation Sindoor, indicate a potential shift towards a more assertive approach, signalling a willingness to conduct cross-border strikes against alleged terrorist infrastructure inside Pakistan.1 This evolving strategy aims to raise the costs for Pakistan's alleged support for terrorism, challenging its long-held assumption that its nuclear deterrent can completely shield it from conventional retaliation for such activities.

Rapid advancements in military technology are also significantly influencing the deterrence equation between India and Pakistan. The increasing sophistication and accuracy of precision strike capabilities, including advanced missiles and air-launched munitions, are altering the dynamics of conventional warfare and deterrence by enabling India to conduct targeted operations against Pakistan without necessarily resorting to large-scale conventional engagements. This capability potentially enhances India's conventional deterrence below the nuclear threshold by allowing it to inflict punitive damage on specific targets, thereby reducing the risk of escalation associated with broader military actions. The development of cyber warfare capabilities introduces another layer of complexity, creating new vulnerabilities and the potential for miscalculation. Cyberattacks can blur the lines between peace and conflict and could be misinterpreted as acts of conventional aggression, increasing the risk of unintended escalation. India's pursuit of missile defense systems could be perceived by Pakistan as an attempt to negate its nuclear deterrent, potentially leading to a further arms race and increased instability as Pakistan seeks countermeasures to ensure the survivability of its nuclear arsenal. The increasing use of drones and other unmanned systems for intelligence gathering and potential offensive operations below the nuclear threshold adds another dimension to the deterrence challenge. Finally, the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into military decision-making, command and control systems, and weapons platforms has the potential to significantly impact the stability of the deterrence relationship, introducing new uncertainties and risks of miscalculation.

Over the years, India and Pakistan have implemented various Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) aimed at reducing tensions and enhancing trust. These measures have included the establishment of military hotlines, pre-notification of missile tests, agreements on not attacking each other's nuclear facilities, and promoting people-to-people exchanges. While these CBMs have played a role in facilitating communication and preventing some misunderstandings, their overall effectiveness in fundamentally altering the adversarial relationship and preventing crises has been limited. The deep-seated mistrust and political obstacles that characterize the India-Pakistan relationship often undermine the implementation and sustainability of these measures. Major crises and significant terrorist attacks have frequently derailed progress achieved through CBMs, highlighting the fragility of the confidence-building process. To enhance their effectiveness, there is a need for strengthening and expanding CBMs, including the potential for institutionalizing nuclear risk reduction centres and establishing more robust and reliable communication mechanisms at various levels.

The involvement of international actors and the broader geopolitical dynamics also play a significant role in shaping the India-Pakistan deterrence relationship. External powers, particularly the United States and China, have significant influence in the region. International pressure and diplomatic interventions have often been instrumental in de-escalating crises between India and Pakistan, such as during the Kargil War and the 2001-2002 standoff, highlighting the limitations of purely bilateral mechanisms for crisis management.5 The strategic alignments and interests of major powers, including the complex and evolving relationship between the US and both India and Pakistan, and China's close and enduring ties with Pakistan, significantly influence the regional security dynamics and constrain the options available to both India and Pakistan. The global focus on counter-terrorism has also placed considerable pressure on Pakistan to address international concerns regarding its alleged support for terrorist groups operating across the border in India, potentially influencing its strategic behavior. Regional geopolitical developments, such as the protracted instability in Afghanistan, can also have a significant impact on the security calculus of both India and Pakistan.

In conclusion, India's struggle to establish a stable conventional deterrence against Pakistan below the nuclear threshold is a result of a complex interplay of historical factors, strategic doctrines, technological advancements, and geopolitical realities. The enduring Kashmir dispute and the deep-seated historical animosity continue to fuel mistrust and instability. The stability-instability paradox, coupled with Pakistan's reliance on its nuclear arsenal and asymmetric tactics, creates a challenging security environment for India. While India has sought to enhance its conventional capabilities through doctrines like Cold Start and by employing precision strike capabilities, these efforts are constantly countered by Pakistan's development of tactical nuclear weapons and its continued use of proxy warfare.

The challenge of deterring state-sponsored cross-border terrorism further complicates India's strategic calculus. Emerging military technologies introduce both opportunities and risks, potentially altering the deterrence balance in unpredictable ways. The effectiveness of existing Confidence Building Measures has been limited, and the influence of international actors, while sometimes helpful in de-escalating crises, does not fundamentally resolve the underlying tensions. Moving forward, achieving greater stability in the India-Pakistan relationship will likely require a multi-pronged approach. This includes the resumption of meaningful dialogue aimed at addressing the core issues, particularly Kashmir; strengthening crisis communication and escalation control mechanisms to prevent unintended conflict; expanding and institutionalizing effective Confidence Building Measures, including nuclear risk reduction centres; promoting greater transparency and predictability in military doctrines and capabilities; and sustained engagement from the international community to encourage peaceful resolution of disputes. Ultimately, avoiding conflict and maintaining strategic stability in the South Asian region remains of paramount importance, requiring careful navigation of the complex deterrence dilemma that continues to define the relationship between these two nuclear-armed neighbours.

Table 1: Major Indo-Pakistani Wars and Crises

Name of Conflict/Crisis	Year	Primary Cause(s)	Outcome	Impact on Deterrence Dynamics
Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-1948	1947-1948	Dispute over the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir	Kashmir divided; India controls two-thirds, Pakistan one-third.	Set the stage for future conflict over Kashmir.
Indo-Pakistani War of 1965	1965	Pakistan's attempt to incite insurgency in Kashmir	Stalemate; both sides claimed victory.	Highlighted the conventional military capabilities and limitations of both sides.
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971	1971	Bangladesh Liberation War	Pakistan defeated; Bangladesh established.	Significantly altered the regional power balance in India's favour.
Kargil War	1999	Pakistani incursion into Indian-controlled Kashmir	Pakistan forced to withdraw under international pressure; Indian victory.	Demonstrated the limitations of nuclear deterrence in preventing sub-nuclear conflict.
2001-2002 India-Pakistan Standoff (Operation Parakram)	2001-2002	Terrorist attack on Indian Parliament	Military mobilization but no full-scale war.	Highlighted the dangers of brinkmanship between nuclear-armed states and the role of international mediation.
Operation Sindoor	2025	Terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir	Indian missile strikes on alleged terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan.	Latest example of India's more assertive conventional response to cross-border terrorism below the nuclear threshold.

Table 2: Comparison of India and Pakistan's Military Capabilities (As of May 2025)

Category	India	Pakistan
Active Military Personnel	5,137,550	1,704,000
Combat Tanks	3,151	1,839
Military Aircraft	2,229	1,399
Nuclear Warheads (Est.)	172-180	170-200
Key Doctrines	No First Use, Cold Start (Evolving to Integrated Battle Groups)	First Use Possible, Full Spectrum Deterrence

Table 3: Key Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) Between India and Pakistan

Type of CBM	Year Implemented	Key Provisions	Effectiveness/Current Status
Agreement on Non-Attack of Nuclear Facilities	1988	Agreement not to attack each other's nuclear installations and facilities. Exchange of lists annually.	Largely adhered to; lists exchanged annually for 34 consecutive years.
Lahore Declaration	1999	Commitment to intensify bilateral security dialogue, elevate talks to foreign minister level, risk reduction measures.	Initial progress stalled after Kargil War and subsequent tensions.
Hotlines between Military Authorities	Various	Establishment of communication links to prevent accidental escalation.	Existence acknowledged, but effectiveness questioned during crises; not always utilized promptly.
Pre-notification of Ballistic Missile Tests	2005	Agreement to provide advance notification of ballistic missile test flights.	Generally followed, but does not cover cruise missiles.
Ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC)	2003	Agreement to observe a ceasefire along the LoC in Kashmir.	Fragile; regularly violated by both sides with exchanges of fire.

 

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